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11 Introduction
This paper studies the role of industrial policies in a growth model with multiple
industries. In the real world, for better or worse, almost all the economies
have adopted and are still adopting various industrial policies.1 Yet the e⁄ect
of industrial policies is always highly controversial. On the one hand, many
empirical and case studies suggest that industrial policies have mostly failed and
the overall performance of industrial policies is very mixed and insigni￿cant;2
but on the other hand, ample research, especially case studies, contends that
industrial policies and government facilitation are crucially important for most,
if not all, of the cases of successful industrial development.3
The main purpose of this paper is to help reconcile these two di⁄erent em-
pirical facts and views, which tend to convey opposite implications for the desir-
ability of industrial policies. More speci￿cally, we try to shed some new light on
why "similar" industrial policies work in some cases but fail in others. Any use-
ful discussion on industrial policies must involve the existence of certain market
imperfections. In this paper we will revisit and focus on the issue of Marshal-
lian externality, the importance of which is widely recognized in the existing
literature. For example, one in￿ uential study on coordination failure with the
presence of externality is the big-push theory proposed by Rosenstein-Roden
and beautifully formalized by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). The key
policy implication derived from this literature is that government intervention
(support) is justi￿ed if an industry exhibits Marshallian externality.
However, if the existence of Marshallian externality is a su¢ cient condition
for government intervention, how to explain why many "big-push" industrial
policies failed? For example, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the former Soviet
Union set the capital-intensive and technology-intensive aerospace industry as
its target industry, in which Marshallian externality indeed existed. The gov-
ernment tried hard to coordinate and push the industry to be established. But
the social welfare loss actually exceeded the gain from such intervention because
the resources for consumption goods production were tremendously reduced and
resource allocation created huge distortions when developing such an excessively
capital-intensive industry. Similar stories of industrial policies could also be told
about China, India and many other developing countries after World War II. The
dominant social thought at that time was interventionism based on the rationale
of "big push". These countries tried to emulate the rich countries by establish-
ing as soon as possible the same industries that prevailed in the most developed
countries. Those target industries were typically capital-intensive and also had
signi￿cant Marshallian externality. Coordination was indeed implemented but
1See, for example, Wade (1990) and Chang (2003), Lin (2009) and Lin and Monge (2010).
2For example, Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) provide a nice literature review. Also
see Pack and Saggi (2006) and the papers cited there.
3For example, Canda (2006) provides fourteen detailed cases studies for successful indus-
trial upgrading; Rodrik (1996, 2006) discussed, among others, the positive role of industrial
policies in several East Asia economies; Ohashi (2005) studies the steel industry in Japan.
Also see Lin and Monge (2010) and the papers cited in all the aforementioned research.
2the industrial development largely failed because the target industries simply
went against the comparative advantage of those capital-scarce economies (see
Lin, 2009). Meanwhile, by contrast, industrial policies are widely believed suc-
cessful in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan for the same period.
These economies followed comparative advantage and upgraded their industries
step by step toward more capital-intensive ones as they accumulated capital on
the growth path.
These observations suggest that we should bear in mind the factor endow-
ment when examining industrial policies. Unfortunately, almost the whole ex-
isting literature of Marshallain externality and industrial policies assumes, pre-
sumably for analytical simplicity, that labor is the only input in the production
function. As a result, there is no explicit role for capital and the structure of the
factor endowments in the discussion of industrialization and policies. A novel
feature of this paper is, therefore, to reexamine the industrial policies by ex-
plicitly introducing capital (and its accumulation) into our theoretical analysis.
Adding this extra layer of complexity not only makes the model more realistic,
but more importantly, there are at least three potential gains that warrant such
an investigation.
First, it points to the importance of identifying the right industry target that
needs government intervention. The existing literature on coordination failure
largely ignores this important issue by typically assuming that there exist two
industries with only one industry exhibiting Marshallian externality, thus it is
common knowledge which industry needs government support. However, as
we argued, the existence of Marshallian externality (or pecuniary externality)
alone is not su¢ cient to warrant government intervention. Factor endowment
also matters. We have to take the capital intensity of each di⁄erent industry
and the capital abundance into account when identifying the right industry tar-
gets. Moreover, the target industry that needs coordination is also changing
endogenously as the structure of factor endowment changes over time. Conse-
quently, in our model we assume that there are three industries with di⁄erent
capital intensities and more than two industries exhibit Marshallian externality.
It is necessary to have at least three industries to discuss the e⁄ect of indus-
trial policies that aim to facilitate "leap forward" in the industrial upgrading,
as occurred in the former Soviet Union and many developing countries.
Second, an important technical question in the literature of industrial poli-
cies is how to select an equilibrium because there typically exist multiple equi-
libria in a coordination game. Discussions have focused on what determines
the relative importance of history versus expectation (see, Krugman (1991),
Matsuyama (1991), for example). Once capital is introduced into the model,
however, agglomeration is no longer the only economic force that determines the
production cost (hence the competitiveness) of an industry. The relative price
of capital and labor also matters in a general equilibrium fashion. As our model
will show, sometimes the factor price e⁄ect dominates the agglomeration e⁄ect
so that the equilibrium may restore uniqueness, making equilibrium selection
less controversial.
Third, in the existing literature of coordination failures and industrial poli-
3cies, dynamic analyses mainly focus on the stability of an equilibrium by as-
suming some costly adjustment process in a heuristic and ad hoc way (see
Mussa(1978), Panagarya(1986), Krugman(1991), etc.) or when there exists de-
mographic change (see Matuyama, 1991). Besides, none of these papers studies
the industrial upgrading in the economic growth framework. However, once
capital is introduced, it becomes very natural to examine the industrial policy
and industrial upgrading issues in the standard Ramsey growth framework with
endogenous saving, which allows us to analyze industrial policies along with
GDP growth and industrialization.
In light of these arguments, we build a simple growth model with three indus-
tries, each of which exhibits increasing returns to scale (Marshallian externality)
and di⁄ers in capital intensity. The key result is that industrial policies may
succeed or fail, depending on whether the target industry for coordination is cor-
rectly identi￿ed in a timely manner. We show that in some cases industries may
eventually upgrade successfully in an intervention-free market economy despite
the existence of Marshallian externality and coordination problems. However,
industrial upgrading under laissez-faire policies may be seriously delayed and
thus can be Pareto improved if the right industry target is identi￿ed in time and
"pushed" by the government appropriately. But if the government identi￿es the
wrong industry and "pushes" it, the economy would end up in an equilibrium
Pareto inferior to the laissez-faire market equilibrium. The "right" industry
target in our model endogenously changes over time, depending on the capital
endowment of the economy. We hope that our model will help deepen our un-
derstanding on the important question why industrial policies have succeeded
in some circumstances but failed in others, although Marshallian externality
always exists in all these cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies a static
economy with only two industries and the basic economic forces are explained.
It is extended to a static economy with three industries in Section 3, which
allows for the discussion on "leap-forward" industrial upgrading and policies. In
the subsequent sections, the industrial upgrading and policies are analyzed in a
Ramsey growth framework. In particular, Section 4 studies the dynamic model
in which endowment structure changes endogenously. Section 5 examines the
robustness of our theoretical results to the variations of the equilibrium concepts
and relevant functional forms. The last section concludes.
2 Two Industries
Consider a static and small open economy populated by L identical agents, each
of whom is endowed with one unit of labor and E units of capital. There are
two di⁄erent industries, each producing a distinct consumption good. Call them





4where the ￿nal aggregate consumption C is a composite of both consumption
of good 1 (denoted by c1) and consumption of good 2 (denoted by c2). Func-
tion C(c1;c2) can take any form as long as C1(c1;c2) > 0 and C2(c1;c2) > 0.
Let pi denote the world price of consumption good i. Normalize p1 = 1 and
assume p2 = ￿, where ￿ > 1. Consumption goods can be traded freely at the
world market but the production factors (labor and capital) cannot move across
borders.
To operate, each ￿rm requires one unit of labor. Therefore, the total number




i ;￿i 2 (0;1) (1)
where ni is the total number of ￿rms in industry i and ki is capital input in
each representative ￿rm in industry i. There exists Marshallian externality so
A(ni) is a strictly increasing function of ni. To sharpen the analytical results,
let us assume A(ni) ￿ A0e￿ni, where ￿ and A0 are both positive parameters.
Without loss of generality assume ￿2 > ￿1 so good 2 is more capital-intensive.
L is an integer, so is ni.
Both labor and capital can freely move across the two industries. All the
markets are perfectly competitive and each ￿rm earns zero pro￿t in the equilib-
rium after paying the capital and labor cost. Let w and r denote the equilibrium
wage and rental price of capital.
Lemma 1 If both industries operate, then the capital of each ￿rm in an indus-
try will strictly increase with the number of ￿rms in the same industry.
Proof. The equalization of capital return across the two industries implies
￿1A(n1)
￿
E ￿ (L ￿ n1)k2
n1
￿￿1￿1
= ￿2￿A(L ￿ n1)k
￿2￿1
2 ; (2)
which immediately implies that k2(n1) is a strictly decreasing function of n1
and hence a strictly increasing function of n2. (2) can be also rewritten as
￿1A(n1)k
￿1￿1







which implies that k1(n1) must be a strictly increasing function.
The economic intuition is straightforward. When an agent moves, say, from
industry 1 to industry 2, the marginal productivity of capital of each ￿rm in
industry 2 strictly increases and thus becomes larger than that in industry 1,
so capital is attracted to industry 2.
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, at most one industry exists.
5Proof. By contradiction, suppose in some equilibrium both industries coexist,






Zero pro￿t condition, equalization of wage across the two industries and (3)
jointly imply
w = (1 ￿ ￿1)A(n1)k
￿1
1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿2)A(n2)k
￿2
2 : (4)
Labor market clearing condition is
n1 + n2 = L: (5)
Capital market clearing condition is
n1k1 + n2k2 = E: (6)
So we have four unknowns: n1,n2, k1, k2 and four equations (3) to (6). Then r
and w can be pinned down by (3) and (4) respectively. Consider an individual
agent (￿rm) in industry 1. If it unilaterally moves to industry 2, then
n0
1 = n1 ￿ 1;n0
2 = n2 + 1;
this deviating agent rationally expects that the market-clearing rental price of
capital would change from r to r0, correspondingly, k1 and k2 also change to
k0
1 and k0
2, which must still satisfy (3) and (6), it remains to check whether the
(entrepreneurial) wage becomes better.
(1 ￿ ￿1)A(n1)k
￿1
1 < ￿(1 ￿ ￿2)A(n2 + 1)k
0￿2
2 ;
which, according to (4), is equivalent to
￿(1 ￿ ￿2)A(n2)k
￿2














which must hold because the previous Lemma implies k2 < k0
2. It contradicts
that the economy was in an equilibrium.
This proposition states that the two industries cannot coexist in any equi-
librium. Next we explore the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which
only one industry exists. First suppose it is an equilibrium that all the ￿rms












6Now consider an individual agent (￿rm) in industry 1. Suppose it unilaterally
shifts to industry 2, then
n0
1 = L ￿ 1;n0
2 = 1;
this deviating agent rationally expects that market clearing rental price of capi-
tal may change from r to r0, correspondingly, k1 and k2 also change to k0
1 and k0
2
to equalize the marginal return to capital in both industries after this deviation.
That is,



















which uniquely determines k0
2. It remains to check whether the (entrepreneurial)






> ￿(1 ￿ ￿2)A(1)k
0￿2
2 ;













































In other words, "all ￿rms stay in industry 1" is a Nash equilibrium if and only





E￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿) = 0 (10)
@E￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿)
@L






> 0, suppose L > 1 + ￿2 (12)
7The intuition for (10) is that as the price of good 2 increases, it would strengthen
the incentive of a marginal ￿rm to deviate to industry 2, so capital endowment
has to be smaller to keep the marginal ￿rm from deviating. (11) is due to the
fact that the marginal impact of each ￿rm on the strength of Marshallian exter-
nality becomes larger as the number of ￿rms increases (due to the exponential
functional form), therefore once a ￿rm deviates from industry 1 to industry 2,
the marginal decrease in the productivity of the ￿rms in industry 1 becomes
larger if the total number of ￿rms increases, therefore, it makes unilateral devi-
ation more attractive. (12) is because the stronger the Marshallian externality


























2 = L ￿ 1;
this deviating agent rationally expects that market clearing rental price of capi-
tal may change from r to r0, correspondingly, k1 and k2 also change to k0
1 and k0
2




1 = ￿2￿A(L ￿ 1)k
0￿2￿1
2














which uniquely determines k0
1. It remains to check whether the (entrepreneurial)















































In other words, "all ￿rms stay in industry 2" is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if E > E￿￿. E￿￿ = E￿￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2). We can show that
@E￿￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿)
@￿












< 0, suppose L > 1 + ￿2: (17)
The intuition for (15) is that, since the price of good 2 is multiplied to the pro-
ductivity of the ￿rms in industry 2, an increase in the price of good 2 will amplify
the marginal loss in the attractiveness of industry 2 when a ￿rm unilaterally
deviates from industry 2 to industry 1, therefore making such a deviation more
likely to happen. The intuition for (16) is that, as the total number of ￿rms
increases in industry 2, the Marshallian externality becomes stronger; therefore
the capital stock must be su¢ ciently scarce (hence expensive) in order to induce
one ￿rm to unilaterally deviate from industry 2 to industry 1, which employs
less capital. (17) is due to the fact that industry 2 becomes more attractive as
the Marshallian externality is strengthened in that industry, so it requires the









Remark 3 When E￿￿ ￿ E￿, we have the following result: When E 2 (0;E￿￿),
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all the ￿rms are in industry 1; when
E 2 [E￿￿;E￿), there are two equilibria: "all in industry 1" and "all in industry
2"; when E 2 [E￿;1), there is a unique equilibrium, in which all the ￿rms are
in industry 2.
Remark 4 When E￿ < E￿￿, we have the following result: When E 2 (0;E￿],
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all the ￿rms are in industry 1; When
E 2 (E￿￿;E￿), there is no pure strategy equilibrium; When E 2 [E￿￿;1), there
is a unique equilibrium, in which all the ￿rms are in industry 2.
Remark 5 E￿￿ ￿ E￿ when ￿ is su¢ ciently small.
93 Three Industries
Now suppose there is another industry called industry 3 with production func-
tion given by (1) and ￿3 > ￿2. Assume p3 ￿ ￿3 > p2 ￿ ￿2 > p1 ￿ 1.
De￿ne
E1 ￿ E￿ (￿2;L;￿1;￿2)
E2 ￿ E￿ (￿3;L;￿1;￿3)













E6 ￿ E￿￿ (￿3;L;￿1;￿3)
where functions E￿(:;:;:;:) and E￿￿(:;:;:;:) are given by (9) and (14), respec-
tively. Obviously, 0 < Ei < 1 for any i 2 f1;2;3;4;5;6g.
Proposition 6 There must exist at most one industry in any equilibrium. "All
￿rms are in industry 1" is an equilibrium if and only if E ￿ minfE1;E2g; "all
￿rms are in industry 2" is an equilibrium if and only if E 2 [E3;E4]; and "all
￿rms are in industry 3" is an equilibrium if and only if E ￿ maxfE5;E6g.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that whenever E ￿ E1, no ￿rms have
incentive to unilaterally deviate to industry 2 if initially all ￿rms are in industry
1. Whenever E ￿ E2, no ￿rms have incentive to unilaterally deviate to industry
3 if initially all ￿rms are in industry 1; Therefore, if and only if E ￿ minfE1;E2g,
it is an equilibrium that "all ￿rms are in industry 1". Similarly, whenever
E ￿ E3, no ￿rms have incentive to unilaterally deviate to industry 1 if initially
all ￿rms are in industry 2. Whenever E ￿ E4, no ￿rms have incentive to
unilaterally deviate to industry 3 if initially all ￿rms are in industry 2. Therefore,
whenever E3 ￿ E ￿ E4, it is an equilibrium that "all ￿rms are in industry 2".
Whenever E ￿ E5, no ￿rms have incentive to unilaterally deviate to industry 2
if initially all ￿rms are in industry 3; whenever E ￿ E6, no ￿rms have incentive
to unilaterally deviate to industry 1 if initially all ￿rms are in industry 3; so
whenever E ￿ maxfE5;E6g, it is an equilibrium that "all ￿rms are in industry
3".
This proposition implies that "all ￿rms are in industry 1" is a unique equi-
librium so long as E is su¢ ciently small. Likewise, "all ￿rms are in industry
3" is a unique equilibrium so long as E is su¢ ciently large. However, nothing
ensures the non-emptiness of the interval [E3;E4], so it is possible that "all ￿rms
are in industry 2" can never be an equilibrium for any E.
In addition, there could be multiple equilibria for any given E. For example,
whenever E 2 [maxfE5;E6g;minfE1;E2g] \ [E3;E4], there exist three equilib-
ria: "all in industry 1", "all in industry 2" and "all in industry 3". Whenever
there exist multiple equilibria, those equilibria can always be Pareto ranked.
10Lemma 7 maxfE3;E5g < E6 and E2 < minfE1;E4g:
Proof. Because of the properties of functions E￿(:;:;:;:) and E￿￿(:;:;:;:) to-
gether with the facts that ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3 and ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3.
Corollary 8 Suppose ￿3 is su¢ ciently small. When E 2 (0;E3); there is a
unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E6); there
are two equilibria: all in industry 1 and all in industry 2; when E 2 [E6;E2],
there are three equilibria: all in 1, all in 2, and all in 3; when E 2 (E2;E4], there
are two equilibria: all in industry 2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1);
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3.
Proof. E6 ￿ E2 when ￿3 is su¢ ciently small, so the previous lemma implies
maxfE3;E5g < E6 ￿ E2 < minfE1;E4g: (18)
The rest of the argument comes from Proposition 6.
Appendix 1 discusses what happens if (18) is not satis￿ed. It would be
useful to know when which industry is Pareto optimal. For any i < j, the total






























We have the following useful lemma:
Lemma 9 Suppose ￿1 < ￿3 < ￿2. Industry 1 (that is, all ￿rms are in industry
1) Pareto dominates when E < ￿1, industry 2 Pareto dominates when E 2
(￿1;￿2), industry 3 Pareto dominates when E 2 (￿2;1).






> 1 and ￿1 ￿ ￿2 > ￿2 ￿ ￿3 > ￿1 ￿ ￿3:
This lemma tells us which is the Pareto optimal industry, but nothing so far
ensures that these Pareto optimal outcomes be automatically achieved by the
free market.
Conjecture 10 The social optimal industry is always a Nash equilibrium. That
is, ￿1 2 (0;E2], ￿2 2 (E3;E4], ￿3 2 [E6;1).
114 Dynamic Model










K(t) = F [K(t);i(t)] ￿ ￿K(t) ￿ C(t)
K(0) = K0 is given and su¢ ciently small
where i(t) 2 f1;2;3g indicates the industry choice at time t and the correspond-
ing production function is
F [K(t);i] = ￿iA(L)L1￿￿iK￿i; for i = 1;2;3:
Obviously, the existence of Marshallian externality makes the welfare theorems
no longer applicable here. Therefore, we will proceed by ￿rst characterizing
the Pareto optimal allocation that a benevolent social planner would choose.
Then we will analyze the market equilibrium without government intervention,
followed by a comparative analysis of the two scenarios, based on which policies
will be discussed. For analytical simplicity, attention will be mainly focused on
the case without productivity growth within an industry.
4.1 Pareto Optimal Allocation






1; when K(t) ￿ ￿1
2; when ￿1 < K(t) ￿ ￿2
3; when K(t) > ￿2
: (19)











￿ ￿K(t) ￿ C(t)
￿
+ 1 [￿1 ￿ K(t)];
where ￿ is the co-state variable and  1 is the Lagrangian multiplier. First order






= ￿￿1￿￿1A(L)L1￿￿1K￿1￿1 +  1
 1 [￿1 ￿ K(t)] = 0; 1 ￿ 0, K(t) ￿ ￿1







K(t) = ￿1A(L)L1￿￿1K￿1 ￿ ￿K(t) ￿ C(t):










1 = ￿1A(L)L1￿￿1 (Kss)
￿1 ￿ ￿Kss



























































i > ￿i for both i = 1;2.4 There is a unique Pareto optimal
dynamic allocation as illustrated by curve BB in the following phase diagram
(see Figure 1). The economy starts with a su¢ ciently small initial capital stock
4For example, it holds when
￿1 = 0:1;￿2 = 0:2;￿3 = 0:4;￿2 = 1:2;￿3 = 1:44; ￿ = 0:03;L = 100:
and
￿ = 0:05;￿ = 0:05;
because then we have
E3 < E6 < ￿1 < ￿2 < Kss
1 < Kss
2 < E2 < Kss
3 < E4: (20)
13K0, and all the ￿rms stay in industry 1, so the economy will move northeast
along the curve BB until capital reaches ￿1, at which point all the ￿rms move to
industry 2, so the economy continues to move northeast until the capital reaches
￿2, at which point all the ￿rms simultaneously shift to industry 3 and stay there
afterwards. Therefore, the economy will follow the saddle path and eventually
converge to the steady state SS3. In other words, it requires sequential multiple
coordination to achieve the Pareto optimality.
[Figure 1]
Suppose Kss
1 > ￿1 but Kss
2 < ￿2. There are still several di⁄erent pos-
sibilities. When ￿2 is su¢ ciently close to Kss
2 , the Pareto optimal allocation
may follow a non-monotonic path as illustrated by curve BHB in Figure 2.
The economy starts from industry 1 and then shifts to industry 2 when capital
reaches ￿1, after which the economy stays in industry 2 until capital reaches
￿2 at point H. The economy stays in industry 3 afterwards and eventually
converges to steady state SS3.
[Figure 2]
However, if ￿2 is su¢ ciently larger than Kss
2 but not too large (close to
Kss
3 ), then in order to approach steady state 3 by following the rule (19), the
economy would have to follow a discontinuous path as illustrated in Figure 3.
The economy initially follows the lotus BH and consumption jumps from H to
D precisely when capital reaches ￿2, the economy shifts to industry 3 afterwards
and eventually converges to steady state SS3.
[Figure 3]
Discontinuous consumption is certainly not desirable for consumers and
hence cannot be Pareto optimal. When ￿2 is su¢ ciently larger than Kss
2 , it
may be strictly better o⁄ to give up industry 3 and instead converge to steady
state SS2 with industry 2 although it is feasible to upgrade to industry 3. See
Figure 4.
[Figure 4]
Similar reasoning also applies when Kss
1 < ￿1, in which case the Pareto
optimal dynamic allocation may eventually converge to steady state SS1 with
industry 1 when ￿1 exceeds Kss
1 signi￿cantly.
To summarize,
Proposition 11 Suppose K(0) is su¢ ciently small. When the time discount
rate ￿ is su¢ ciently small ( Kss
i > ￿i for both i = 1;2), the Pareto optimal
allocation is such that industries will upgrade step by step from industry 1 to
industry 2 and then to industry 3. When ￿ is su¢ ciently large ( Kss
1 ￿ ￿1),
the Pareto optimal allocation is that the industries will remain in industry 1.
When ￿ is in some middle range, the Pareto optimal allocation is such that the
industries will ￿rst stay in industry 1 and then upgrade to industry 2 and stay
there forever.
144.2 Laissez-faire Market Equilibrium
Next let us examine the market equilibrium (or equilibria). At each time point,
given the inherited capital stock, the equilibrium industrial choices are the same
as in the static model shown in Section 3. That is, all the ￿rms simultaneously
and non-cooperatively make their industrial choices (production decision) at
each time point. The consumption and saving decisions are made after output
is produced. For simplicity, we will focus on the symmetric equilibria in which
all the ￿rms behave identically. To simplify the analysis, we assume ￿3 is
su¢ ciently small (so that Corollary 8 applies) and ￿1 < ￿3 < ￿2 (so that Lemma
9 applies).
Suppose the initial capital stock is su¢ ciently small (K(0) < E3), so the
market equilibrium must start with industry 1. By revoking Corollary 8, we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 12 Industry 1 can be the industry in the long-run steady state only
if Kss
1 2 (0;E2], industry 2 can be in the steady state only if Kss
2 2 [E3;E4],
industry 3 can be in the steady state only if Kss
3 2 [E6,1).
This lemma is useful in determining the steady state of the economy. For
example, industry 1 cannot be the steady state industry if ￿ is su¢ ciently
small such that Kss
1 > E2. Using this logic, we can easily obtain the following
proposition after studying the associated Hamiltonian system.
Proposition 13 When ￿ is su¢ ciently large such that Kss
3 < E3, then the
only dynamic equilibrium is that industry 1 will persist forever, which is also
Pareto optimal. By contrast, when ￿ is su¢ ciently small such that Kss
1 >
E4, the economy will eventually approach steady state 3, although there may
exist multiple equilibrium transitional dynamic paths, some of which are strictly
Pareto dominated.
Proof. According to Corollary 8, the market equilibrium industry must be
industry 3 whenever K(t) > E4 and must be industry 1 whenever K(t) ￿ E3.
This proposition implies that the market equilibrium itself is Pareto optimal
when people are su¢ ciently impatient, even though each industry exhibits Mar-
shallian externality. When people are su¢ ciently patient, the market itself will
successfully upgrade the industry and end up with the Pareto optimal industry
in the long run. The most complicated case is when ￿ falls in the middle range,
to which we now turn.
Now we have E3 ￿ Kss
3 and Kss
1 ￿ E4. In general, there could be a contin-
uum of di⁄erent dynamic market equilibria. For example, consider the following
case: Kss
1 < E3. One possible market equilibrium is that the economy follows
from the beginning the unique saddle path that converges to steady state 1 (de-
noted by point SS1). Another possible equilibrium is that the economy stays
in industry 1 and capital exceeds E3 at some time point, then the economy
may immediately shift to industry 2 or shift to industry 2 after a while so long
15as capital exceeds E3, and the economy eventually converges to steady state 2
(denoted by point SS2). One possible equilibrium path is depicted by curve
BHSS2 in Figure 5. Notice that the economy shifts to industry 2 at point H,
which is indeterminate depending on the initial consumption (that is, the y-axis




A third possible equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6. The economy starts
with industry 1 at point B and then switches to industry 2 at point H and
stays in industry 2 until point A, at which the economy shifts to industry 3 and
stays there forever by following the unique saddle path leading to steady state
3 (denoted by SS3). Again, there can be an in￿nite number of such equilibrium
as long as Kss
3 2 [E6,1):
[FIGURE 6]
There may exist other types of equilibria as well. To illustrate the multiplic-
ity of the market equilibria even further, consider the di⁄erent case, in which
E3 ￿ Kss
1 . It is a possible equilibrium that the economy stays in industry 1
until after the capital exceeds Kss
1 at some time t. What happens after time t is
as if we have an economy with initial capital K0 = K(t). What happens when
K0 ￿ E3? Suppose E3 ￿ Kss
1 ￿ K0 ￿ Kss
2 ￿ E6.
At time 0, the economy could embark on either industry 1 or industry 2.
This can be illustrated in the following phase diagram (Figure 7).
[FIGURE 7]
If the economy chooses industry 1 at time 0 and stays in that industry af-
terwards, the consumption will be denoted by point CAA
0 , and the equilibrium
capital stock and consumption will follow the unique saddle path AA and grad-
ually decrease and eventually the economy approaches steady state 1. Call this
equilibrium 1. If industry 2 is chosen at time 0 and the economy stays in that
industry, the initial consumption will be point CBB
0 and the equilibrium capi-
tal stock and consumption will gradually increase and eventually the economy
approaches steady state 2 . Call this equilibrium 2.
It is not obvious which equilibrium path is Pareto superior: although the
consumption at steady state 2 is strictly higher than in steady state 1, the
consumption on the transitional path is strictly larger at the ￿rst equilibrium
path and this gap exists at least for a while. We know, however, when ￿1 ￿ Kss
2 ,
the ￿rst equilibrium path must Pareto dominate the second equilibrium path.
Likewise, when ￿1 ￿ Kss
1 , the second equilibrium path Pareto dominates the
￿rst one.
The following phase diagram (Figure 8) demonstrates two other possible
types of equilibria, called equilibrium 3 and equilibrium 4, respectively.
16[Figure 8]
In equilibrium 3, the economy starts with consumption at point CAB
0 and
the economy stays in industry 1, therefore the equilibrium consumption and
capital stock will move southeast until it hits the saddle path AA at point H.
From that point on, all the ￿rms shift to industry 2, so the equilibrium path
will move northeast along the saddle path BB, and the economy eventually
approaches steady state 2. Since it is a perfect foresight equilibrium in which
all the ￿rms know when the industry shift will occur, CAB
0 is optimally chosen
such that the economy hits the saddle path BB precisely at the time of industry
switch. Likewise, if people commonly expect that the industry switch will occur
at some capital level di⁄erent from H, then the initial consumption will also be
adjusted accordingly. On this type of equilibrium path, the consumption ￿ ow is
smooth but non-monotonic. The initial relatively low consumption is to ensure
that capital increases enough to reach the saddle path BB. Conceptually we
can Pareto rank these equilibria because we can compute the welfare for each
equilibrium numerically or analytically. Notice that equilibrium 3 can never be
the Pareto optimal equilibrium unless the capital stock at point H is exactly
equal to ￿1, in which case equilibrium 3 must be Pareto superior to equilibrium
1 (shown in Figure 7).
In equilibrium 4, all the ￿rms ￿rst stay in industry 2 with initial consump-
tion denoted by point CBA
0 in Figure 8, the equilibrium path moves northwest
until it arrives at the saddle path AA at point G, after which all the ￿rms
switch to industry 1, so the economy moves southwest along AA and eventually
approaches steady state SS1.
There may also exist other equilibria which involve an in￿nite number of
switches across industries. For example, in an equilibrium perfectly coordi-
nated ￿rms could be continuously jumping (almost vertically) between the AA
path and BB path back and forth, although it is obviously not Pareto optimal
because consumption changes discontinuously. The consumption stream could
also be smooth in an equilibrium with an in￿nite number of switches across
industries. In particular, there may exist a limit cycle, as illustrated in the next
graph (Figure 9). The equilibrium allocation moves along the closed orbit coun-
terclockwise. At point G, all the ￿rms are in industry 1, consumption decreases
while capital stock remains unchanged. All the ￿rms stay in industry 1 until
point M is reached, at which all the ￿rms simultaneously shift to industry 2
and stay there so the equilibrium path starts moving northeast. When point B
is reached, all the ￿rms switch back to industry 1 so the economy moves south-
west and meets point G again. Such a limit cycle, if existing, cannot be Pareto
optimal unless the capital stock associated with the two switching points B and
M are both equal to ￿1.
[Figure 9]
The diversity and multiplicity of the market equilibria may help explain why
the patterns of industrial development are so di⁄erent across di⁄erent countries
or regions in the real world.
174.3 Industrial Policies
Since there may exist multiple market equilibria of industrial development and
some of them are not Pareto optimal, it creates potential room for welfare-
enhancing government intervention through various forms of policies, which we
generally refer to as industrial policies.
For example, consider the case in Figure 1. If the government is fully benevo-
lent and capable enough, it would coordinate the industries to follow the Pareto
optimal equilibrium path as described in Section 4.1. That is, it requires the
government to identify the right target industry and coordinate the industrial
upgrading for multiple times because the Pareto optimal industry shifts over
time as the capital accumulates. Imagine that the government intervention is
restricted to selecting a market equilibrium when multiple equilibria exist. As
discussed earlier, there can be multiple dynamic market equilibria including
those similar to Figures 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, etc., but nothing ensures that the Pareto
optimal equilibrium be realized.
If the government ignores the role of the endowment structure and prema-
turely sets industry 3 as its target industry, which is indeed the case observed
in many developing countries that pursued "comparative-advantage-defying"
development strategies, then it may want to upgrade the industry as soon as
possible. More speci￿cally, it would choose industry 2 immediately when the
capital exceeds E3 and choose industry 3 immediately when the capital exceeds
E6. By doing so, the economy could eventually approach industry 3, but the
cost is that the consumption is suppressed too much on the transitional path
and the welfare may be even lower than some laissez-faire market equilibrium.
If the government identi￿es the right industry target but lacks the capacity
to coordinate in time, the outcome is also ine¢ cient. For example, if there
exists coordination failure, the economy may not be able to escape the initial
equilibrium industry soon enough or even fail to upgrade its industry at all.
Or perhaps the government may manage to coordinate to industry 2 after the
capital exceeds E3 but for some reason fail to coordinate to industry 3 before
the capital closely approaches Kss
2 , then the economy eventually will converge
to steady state 2. In other words, the economy only achieves partial upgrading
of its industry.
All the above analysis on industrial policies is essentially the selection of a
certain market equilibrium out of the multiple market equilibria. Actually the
government typically needs to monitor the whole development process to ensure
that ￿rms are not deviating from the desired path at any point. In other words,
the role of government is not only to coordinate the ￿rms to change to the right
industries at the right time, but also to maintain the status quo for the rest of
the time.
If the set of industrial policies is expanded such that the government can
implement any resource allocation only subject to the resource feasibility con-
straint, then a government which pursues "comparative-advantage-defying" de-
velopment strategies would choose to establish industry 3 from the beginning
18and it can also eventually achieve industry 3, which can never be achieved by the
market itself. Of course, it is not Pareto optimal because the total consumption
is depressed too much.
In the pertinent literature, to tackle the multiplicity of market equilibria, it is
often assumed that there exists an ad hoc frictional adjustment process, so that
whether the industrial upgrading occurs depends on whether "expectation" can
dominate "history", which in turns depends on the magnitude of the discount
rate and the parameters of the adjustment process (see, for example, Krugman,
1991). If the discount rate is su¢ ciently large and/or the adjustment process
is su¢ ciently di¢ cult, then "history" dominates and therefore there is a unique
equilibrium, in which industrial upgrading (or industrialization) cannot occur,
otherwise "expectation" dominates and there are multiple equilibria, some of
which have industrial upgrading. Our previous proposition already partly char-
acterizes how the market equilibrium is a⁄ected by the time discount rate. Now,
to simplify the analysis, suppose that economy starts with initial capital smaller
than E3 and has the strongest path dependence (by revoking Corollary 8) in the
sense that the equilibrium remains to be that "all the industries are in industry
1" whenever K(t) 2 (0;E2]. When K(t) exceeds E2, all the ￿rms could either
suddenly shift to industry 2 or all move to industry 3, depending on people￿ s
expectation; and the industries will stay in industry 3 when K(t) > E4.
In particular, if we resort to the argument that the ￿rst mover would unilat-
erally deviate from industry 1 to industry 3 when K(t) just crosses E2, which
can be veri￿ed, then it implies
i￿(t) =
￿
1; when K(t) ￿ E2
3; when E2 < K(t) : (21)
If, however, we assume that there exists some su¢ ciently small cost of industrial
upgrading and the cost is larger when directly shifting from 1 to 3 than that






1; when K(t) ￿ E2
2; when E2 < K(t) ￿ E4
3; when K(t) > E4
: (22)
To make the analysis concrete, consider the following parametric example:
￿1 = 0:1;￿2 = 0:2;￿3 = 0:4;￿2 = 1:2;￿3 = 1:44; ￿ = 0:03;L = 100;￿ = 0:05;￿ = 0:05;
then we have








L < E2 < Kss
3 < E4;
then under rule (21) or rule (22), there exists a unique market equilibrium, in
which the ￿rms always stay in industry 1 and the economy eventually converges
19to steady state 1.5 By contrast, the Pareto optimal equilibrium for this nu-
merical example is exactly given by Figure 1 and the economy will eventually
converge to steady state 3. This comparison implies that this "constrained" mar-
ket equilibrium is not Pareto optimal, therefore, the government may improve
the welfare by appropriately "relaxing" the "path dependence" constraint, and
alleviating all the constraints once and for all is not su¢ cient to ensure that the
Pareto optimal equilibrium be realized because there are many possible market
equilibria.
So far we have not been explicit about the concrete policy tools that govern-
ment can employ to implement its industrial policy. Traditional policy variables
include the provision of various forms of subsidies, such as tax rebate/holidays,
investment credit, export subsidy, etc., for those investors/￿rms that follow the
recommendation of the government. Policy variables also include imposing pun-
ishment, through tax for example, on those investors/￿rms that do not follow
the recommendation of the government. All these policy tools are applicable
here. It is worth mentioning that, in our model economy, it is often the case
that the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved by the market itself, although
not ensured because there are multiple equilibria. Under that circumstance, the
best the government can do is just to help reduce the coordination cost among
the ￿rms because each ￿rm/investor has su¢ ciently strong incentive to achieve
the Pareto optimal equilibrium and there is no con￿ ict of interest among those
identical investors/￿rms. When the Pareto optimal allocation can never be im-
plemented by the market itself because, for example, there exists coordination
failure or su¢ ciently large cost associated with the e¢ ciency-enhancing collec-
tive action as we have just discussed, then the government should rectify the
relevant market failure with carrot and stick.
Most importantly, we want to emphasize that the crucial prerequisite for
successful industrial policy is that the government identi￿es the "right" indus-
try target in time, that is, the industry which is most consistent with the capital
endowment of the economy. The existence of Marshallian externality itself is in-
su¢ cient to justify government support for that industry. Moreover, the "right"
industry target may endogenously shift over time as the economy develops,
therefore successful industrial policy may require sequential and timely "push"
instead of "once-and-for-all" intervention, as typically examined in the exist-
ing literature. To illustrate the importance of "right identi￿cation", we show
that when the government identi￿es the wrong industrial target and "push" it
accordingly, the economy may be even worse o⁄ than the laissez-faire market










1￿￿1 L is the largest possible value for capital when the initial capital is su¢ ciently





1￿￿1 L, there may exist a second equilibrium, in which the economy
stays in industry 1 until the capital reaches E2, after which the economy swtiches to industry






1￿￿1 L holds or not, there will be a unique equlibrium, in which the
￿rms always stay in industry 1 and the economy eventually converges to steady state 1.
20equilibrium even though the target industry does exhibit Marshallian external-
ity.
5 Further Discussion
In this section, we show that our theoretical results are robust when certain
assumptions in the model setting are changed.
5.1 Sequential Entrance
The market equilibrium at each time point in our previous analysis is the static
Nash equilibrium. What would be the subgame Nash equilibrium if ￿rms are
allowed to move sequentially? Suppose E￿￿ ￿ E￿ < E: The ￿rst ￿rm wants to
move from industry 1 to industry 2 holding other ￿rms staying in industry 1.
Now given that the ￿rst mover has moved, would there be a second mover at
the same level of E? If he stays, he earns






















Using the argument with equation (2) in the proof of Proposition 2, we have
k"2 > k0
2, which in turn implies
(1 ￿ ￿2)￿A(2)k
"￿2
2 > (1 ￿ ￿2)￿A(1)k
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where the second inequality is because E > E￿ as we have shown and the
last inequality holds when k0
2 > E





￿￿2￿￿1. Consequently, this second agent ￿nds it strictly pro￿table to also
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￿1￿1 L1￿￿1:
21The above inequality is true if L is su¢ ciently large, which we will assume true
throughout the paper.
Then as implied by Lemma 1, the rest of the ￿rms in industry 1 will enter
industry 2 one by one until there is only one ￿rm remaining in industry 1. The
last ￿rm has incentives to move to industry 2 if and only if E > E￿￿, which
indeed holds. Consequently, when E￿￿ ￿ E￿ < E, there is a unique subgame
Nash equilibrium in which all the ￿rms will be staying in industry 2. So the
equilibrium outcome is identical to that in the static Nash equilibrium.
5.2 Di⁄erent A(n) Function
People may wonder whether our results depend on the fact that the externality
becomes increasingly stronger when A(n) takes the form of an exponential func-
tion, as we assume in our previous analysis. To address this question, suppose
nothing changes except that now the function A(n) becomes
A(n) = A0n￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1);
so that the marginal increase in the "magnitude" of Marshallian externality is
diminishing when more ￿rms enter the same industry. We ￿rst characterize E￿.

























E￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿) = 0:





E￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿) = 1:
and the intuition is that, the larger the population, the cheaper the labor and
also the stronger the Marshallian externality in the current industry, hence the































22from which we conclude: [1]
@E
￿￿(￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿)
@￿ > 0 and lim
￿!1
E￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿) =
1, when ￿1 ￿ 1
2; [2] suppose ￿ ￿ ￿2, then
@E
￿￿(￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿)






@￿ < 0. We can see that the main properties of functions
E￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿) and E￿￿ (￿;L;￿1;￿2;￿) are almost the same as in the pre-
vious analysis. This implies that all the qualitative features in the previous
analysis will remain intact.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a growth model with multiple industries to study how
industries evolve as capital accumulates endogenously when each industry ex-
hibits Marshallian externality (increasing returns to scale). We show that, in the
long run, the laissez-faire market equilibrium is Pareto optimal when the time
discount rate is su¢ ciently small or su¢ ciently large. When the time discount
rate is moderate, there exists a very rich set of multiple dynamic market equi-
libria, some of which are Pareto dominated. This may help explain why diverse
patterns of industrial development are observed in the real world. To ensure
the economy achieve Pareto e¢ ciency, it would require the government to ￿rst
identify the industry target consistent with the endowment structure and then
to coordinate in a timely manner, possibly for multiple times. However, indus-
trial policies may make people worse o⁄ than in the market equilibrium if the
government picks an industry which deviates too far away from the comparative
advantage of the economy even if the industry exhibits Marshallian externality.
This may help explain why industrial policies succeeded in some countries but
failed in others and why sometimes industrial upgrading may take place even
without government support.
Di⁄erent from the literature, we highlight that the mere existence of Mar-
shallian externality in an industry is insu¢ cient to justify government support
for that industry. Instead, a crucial prerequisite for successful industrial poli-
cies is to ￿rst identify the "right" industry target in time, that is, the industry
which is most consistent with the capital endowment of the economy. Moreover,
we show that the "right" industry target may endogenously shift over time as
the economy develops, therefore successful industrial policy may require sequen-
tial and timely "pushes" instead of "once-and-for-all" intervention, as typically
argued in the existing literature. To illustrate the importance of "right iden-
ti￿cation", we show that when the government identi￿es the wrong industrial
target and "pushes" it accordingly, the economy may be even worse o⁄than the
laissez-faire market equilibrium even though the target industry does exhibit
Marshallian externality.
For the sake of analytical simplicity, just like the standard models in the
literature, our model also assumes away uncertainty associated with the iden-
ti￿cation of the right "industrial target". We also ignore the case where there
are multiple industries with similar capital intensities but insu¢ cient number
of investors (either because of the credit constraint or the scarcity of quali￿ed
23entrepreneurs). Thirdly, industry-speci￿c productivity growth is not incorpo-
rated into our analyses. It would be interesting to explore those and many other
issues in the future.
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26Appendix 1:
When E6 > E2, we could have
E2 < E6 < minfE1;E4g:
or
E2 < minfE1;E4g < E6 < maxfE1;E4g:
or
E2 < minfE1;E4g < maxfE1;E4g < E6:
More speci￿cally,
(a) when
E2 < E6 < minfE1;E4g;
there are following possibilities
maxfE3;E5g < E2 < E6 < minfE1;E4g (24)
minfE3;E5g < E2 < maxfE3;E5g < E6 < minfE1;E4g (25)
E2 < minfE3;E5g < maxfE3;E5g < E6 < minfE1;E4g (26)
Under (24), we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all
stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria: all in industry 1
and all in industry 2; when E 2 (E2;E6), there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all stay in industry 2; when E 2 [E6;E4], there are two equilibria: all in industry
2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 3.
Under (25), we have when E 2 (0;E2); there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E2;E6], there is a unique equilibrium,
in which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E6;E4], there are two equilibria:
all in industry 2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1); there is a unique
equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3.
Under (26), we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E3), there is no equilibrium; when
E 2 (E3;E6), there is unique equilibrium; in which all stay in industry 2; when
E 2 [E6;E4], there are two equilibria: all in industry 2 and all in industry 3;
when E 2 (E4;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry
3.
(b)When
E2 < minfE1;E4g < E6 < maxfE1;E4g:
27there are following possibilities
E2 < minfE1;E4g < maxfE3;E5g < E6 < maxfE1;E4g (27)
E2 < maxfE3;E5g < minfE1;E4g < E6 < maxfE1;E4g (28)
maxfE3;E5g < E2 < minfE1;E4g < E6 < maxfE1;E4g (29)
Under (27), we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all stay in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E3); there is no equilibrium; when E 2
[E3;E6), there is unique equilibrium: industry 2; when E 2 (E6;E4], there are
two equilibria: all in industry 2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1); there
is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3.
Or we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria: all in industry 1 and
all in industry 2; when E 2 [E2;E6], there is a unique equilibrium, in which all
stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E6;E4], there are two equilibria: all in industry
2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 3.
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E6), there is no equilibrium, when E 2 [E6;1);
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example, when
E5 < E2 < E4 < E3 < E6 < E1:
Under (28), we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria:
all in industry 1 and all in industry 2; when E 2 [E2;E6], there is a unique
equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E6;E4], there are two
equilibria: all in industry 2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1); there is a
unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3.
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E3); there is no equilibrium; when E 2 [E3;E6),
there is unique equilibrium: industry 2; when E 2 (E6;E4], there are two
equilibria: all in industry 2 and all in industry 3; when E 2 (E4;1); there is a
unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3.
Or we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all
stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria: all in industry
1 and all in industry 2; when E 2 [E2;E4], there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E4;E6), there are no equilibria; when
E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For
example, when E3 < E2 < E5 < E4 < E6 < E1
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
28in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E3); there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E3;E4],
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E4;E6),
there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all stay in industry 3. For example, when E2 < E3 < E5 < E4 < E6 < E1:
Under (29), we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria:
all in industry 1 and all in industry 2; when E 2 (E2;E4], there is a unique
equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E4;E6), there are no
equilibria; when E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in
industry 3. for example, when maxfE3;E5g < E2 < E4 < E6 < E1
Or we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria: all in industry 1 and
all in industry 2; when E 2 (E2;E6), there is a unique equilibrium, in which all
stay in industry 2; when E 2 [E6;E4], there are two equilibria ,2 and 3; when
E 2 (E4;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. for
example, when maxfE3;E5g < E2 < E1 < E6 < E4
(c) When
E2 < minfE1;E4g < maxfE1;E4g < E6:
there are following possibilities
E2 < minfE1;E4g < maxfE1;E4g < maxfE3;E5g < E6 (30)
E2 < minfE1;E4g < maxfE3;E5g < maxfE1;E4g < E6 (31)
E2 < maxfE3;E5g < minfE1;E4g < maxfE1;E4g < E6 (32)
maxfE3;E5g < E2 < minfE1;E4g < maxfE1;E4g < E6 (33)
Under (30), we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all stay in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E3), there is no equilibrium; when
E 2 [E3;E4], there is unique equilibrium; in which all stay in industry 2; when
E 2 (E4;E6), there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique
equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example, when E2 < E3 <
E1 < E4 < E5 < E6:
Or we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all
stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2]; there are two equilibria: all in industry
1 and all in industry 2; when E 2 (E2;E4], there is a unique equilibrium, in
which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E4;E6), there are no equilibria; when
E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For
example, when E3 < E2 < E1 < E4 < E5 < E6
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E3); there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E3;E4],
29there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 2; when E 2 (E4;E6),
there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique equilibrium, in which
all stay in industry 3. For example, when E2 < E1 < E3 < E4 < E5 < E6
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E6); there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E6;1);
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example, when
E2 < E1 < E4 < E3 < E5 < E6:
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E6), there is no equilibrium; when E 2 [E6;1);
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example, when
E2 < E1 < E4 < E3 < E6 and E5 ￿ E3:
Or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E6), there is no equilibrium; when E 2 [E6;1);
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example, when
E2 < E1 < E4 < E5 < E3 < E6:
or we have when E 2 (0;E3); there is a unique equilibrium, in which all
stay in industry 1; when E 2 [E3;E2], there are two equilibria 1 and 2; when
E 2 (E2;E4], there is unique equilibrium; in which all stay in industry 2; when
E 2 (E4;E6), there are no equilibria; when E 2 [E6;1); there is a unique
equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example, when E3 < E2 <
E4 < E1 < E5 < E6:
or we have when E 2 (0;E2]; there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay
in industry 1; when E 2 (E2;E6), there is no equilibrium; when E 2 [E6;1);
there is a unique equilibrium, in which all stay in industry 3. For example,
when E2 < E4 < E3 < E1 < E5 < E6 or when E2 < E4 < E1 < E3 < E6 and
E5 ￿ E3:
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